Making the Argument that the Smith-Mundt Act Has little Control over the Press\u27 Publication of U.S. Government-Produced Foreign Views by Holladay, Brett
FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW
Volume 10 | Issue 3 Article 6
3-1-2012
Making the Argument that the Smith-Mundt Act
Has little Control over the Press' Publication of U.S.
Government-Produced Foreign Views
Brett Holladay
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/falr
Part of the First Amendment Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in First Amendment
Law Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brett Holladay, Making the Argument that the Smith-Mundt Act Has little Control over the Press' Publication of U.S. Government-Produced
Foreign Views, 10 First Amend. L. Rev. 608 (2012).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/falr/vol10/iss3/6
MAKING THE ARGUMENT THAT THE SMITH-
MUNDT ACT HAS LITTLE CONTROL OVER




In 2011, a Tunisian by the name of Mohamed Bouazizi lit a
match that ignited revolt and revolution across the Arab World.I What
started as an act of self-immolation in response to "rising food prices,
youth unemployment," and the general disdain of living under years of
tyrannical rule, turned into an act of martyrdom that would spark unrest
2
in nations throughout the region. The resulting protest movement
became known as the "Arab Spring," a movement now responsible for
toppling long-ruling governments in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, along
with ongoing bloody revolts in Bahrain, Syria, and Yemen.3
As protests raged in Tahrir Square in downtown Cairo,4 news
agencies in Egypt and throughout the world fought to provide their
audiences with the most up-to-date information available.' One of those
news agencies was Alhurra TV.6 According to a poll ordered by the
* Juris Doctor Candidate, University of North Carolina School of Law, 2013.
1. Thomas L. Friedman, Op-Ed., This Is Just the Start, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2,
2011, at A25.
2. Id.
3. See Anthony Shadid, After Arab Revolts, Reigns of Uncertainty, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 25, 2011, at Al.
4. See Mansoura Ez-Eldin, Op-Ed., Date With a Revolution, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
31, 2011, at Al9.
5. See Jeffrey Fleishman, Delivering 'messages' to Arab World, L.A. TIMES,
Jan. 19, 2011, at 6.
6. See Quarter of Egyptians Tune to Alhurra During Recent Crisis, Press
Release, BROADCASTING BOARD OF GOVERNORS (Feb. 17, 2011), http://www.bbg.
gov/pressroom/press-releases/Quarter of EgyptiansTune toAlhurra During
Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG), Alhurra TV reached an
estimated one-quarter of the market in the important protest cities of
Cairo and Alexandria.' Adding to its accolades in news coverage,
Alhurra was the first news organization to report the forthcoming
resignation of Egypt's President, Hosni Mubarak.8 At first glance,
learning that Alhurra was so effective at delivering the news just appears
to be evidence of a news station doing its job in a diligent manner.
However, what truly sets Alhurra apart from other news agencies in
Egypt is that Alhurra is controlled and funded by the United States
Government.9
Even more interesting about Alhurra's broadcasts is that
according to a provision of the United States Information and
Educational Exchange Act of 1948,o popularly known as the Smith-
Mundt Act, the dissemination of Alhurra programming is prohibited
within the United States." According to two sections of the Smith-Mundt
Act-22 U.S.C. §§ 1461(a), 1461-1-material distributed abroad by
U.S.-controlled news groups may not be disseminated within the United
States.12 Essentially, the American public has been bankrolling United
States created foreign media for over a half a century, with little
knowledge of what it is being said at the expense of their tax dollars.13 In
2010 alone, the BBG, which is the parent organization for Alhurra and
other U.S.-controlled foreign news agencies, had a budget of $758.9




9. See BBG Fact Sheet, VOICE OF AMERICA, http://media.voanews.com/
documents/BBG+Fact+Sheet+4-25-1 1.pdf (last visited Apr. 12, 2012).
10. Pub. L. No. 80-402, ch. 36, tit. 1, § 2, 62 Stat. 6 (1948) (codified as
amended at 22 U.S.C. § 1431 (2006)).
11. See 22 U.S.C. §§ 1461(a), 1461-la (2006).
12. Id. Even though these two provisions purport to ban domestic
dissemination, they interestingly lack any explicit penalties for such dissemination.
Id.
13. See Mark Landler, A New Voice of America For the Age of Twitter, N.Y.
Times, June 8, 2011, at A9.
14. See BBG Fact Sheet, supra note 9.
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Government may be the largest broadcaster that few Americans know
about.""
The Smith-Mundt Act's domestic dissemination ban raises
several issues of concern. First, there is a strong argument that American
taxpayers should have access to the information they are funding and that
is being distributed throughout the world on their behalf for the sake of
diplomacy. 16 Americans are aware that they are not always entitled to
view certain information, such as some national security material, even if
their taxes did pay for the information.' 7 Despite this reality though, the
government-sanctioned production of foreign news involves a much
different issue because the information is being made public to everyone
in the world, except to Americans who are paying for it. In addition to
concerns of government transparency, there is an even more serious issue
involving the constitutionality of such a ban and the limits ii places on
the American press.' 9 Specifically, the ban invokes two First Amendment
issues: the American press' right to access such information and its
20
ability to publish it within the United States.
15. Landler, supra note 13.
16. See, e.g., Allen W. Palmer & Edward L. Carter, The Smith-Mundt Act's
Ban on Domestic Propaganda: An Analysis of the Cold War Statute Limiting Access
to Public Diplomacy, 11 CoMM. L. & POL'Y 1, 31 n.145, 34 (2006).
17. See David H. Topol, United States v. Morison: A Threat to the First
Amendment Right to Publish National Security Information, 43 S.C. L. REV. 581,
593-94 (1992) (arguing that greater public access to government information is
needed, but acknowledging that there are some situations in which access may be
limited for just reasons).
18. See Landler, supra note 13.
19. See Charles F. Gormly, The United States Information Agency Domestic
Dissemination Ban: Arguments for Repeal, 9 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 191, 199-200
(1995) (discussing constitutional concerns emanating from the domestic
dissemination ban and noting that "[o]bservers have criticized the domestic
dissemination ban on constitutional grounds").
20. See Gartner v. U.S. Info. Agency, 726 F. Supp. 1183, 1185 (S.D. Iowa
1989) (stating that the plaintiff's challenge to the Smith-Mundt Act involved a
constitutional challenge regarding (1) "the right to receive information" and (2) the
"right to disseminate information"). Throughout this Note, the press' rights under the
First Amendment are analyzed in the context of the Smith-Mundt Act. It is important
to note early on that the First Amendment's guarantee of a free press does not create
any independent or exclusive rights for the American press that it does not also
preserve for every other member of the public. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S.
665, 703 (1972) (citations omitted) ("Freedom of the press is a 'fundamental
[Vol. 10610
Whereas other commentators have called for revising or
repealing the domestic dissemination ban in order to allow a more robust
wealth of information from the press,2 1 this Note maintains that repealing
the Act's ban is not necessary to obtain such a goal. Therefore, this Note
endorses the perspective that foreign news produced by the United States
government should be more readily available for domestic review;22 an
aim supported both by the notion that the public should be able to view
news that it is financing23 and that ultimately a more open press is
24
necessary for an effective democracy. However, this Note differs from
past arguments in that it contends that amending or repealing the Smith-
25
Mundt Act's ban is not necessary to achieve such a purpose. This
conclusion is reached through an analysis that shows that the Smith-
Mundt Act, in reality, has little control over domestic dissemination, and
ultimately that the First Amendment of the United States Constitution
would hardly tolerate any meaningful regulation of domestic
26
dissemination anyways.
personal right' which 'is not confined to newspapers and periodicals. It necessarily
embraces pamphlets and leaflets . . . . The press in its historic connotation
comprehends every sort of publication which affords a vehicle of information and
opinion."'). In other words, rights held by the press under the First Amendment are
also held by the public, even if members of the public might not define themselves
as members of the press. See id Therefore, when this Note analyzes whether the
press has certain First Amendment rights, it is in fact assessing every American's
rights under the First Amendment. Thus, any mention of a right that the press might
possess should not be understood as a right exclusive to the press, but as one held by
everyone in the United States. Press rights, instead of broadly held public rights, are
discussed specifically throughout the following sections because this Note focuses
on the press' ability to gather and publish news under the Smith-Mundt Act, not the
public's ability to do so.
21. See Gormly, supra note 19, at 219-20; Jeremy Berkowitz, Raising the Iron
Curtain on Twitter: Why the United States Must Revise the Smith-Mundt Act to
Improve Public Diplomacy, 18 CoMMLAw CONSPECTUS 269, 308-09 (2009).
22. See Palmer & Carter, supra note 16, at 1-3 (discussing the importance of
the "free and open flow of information" in the United States and abroad).
23. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
24. See Roy S. Gutterman, Chilled Bananas: Why Newsgathering Demands
More First Amendment Protection, 50 SYRACUSE L. REV. 197, 205 (2000)
("The press must gather and disseminate truthful information to fuel the
democracy.").
25. See infra Parts III and IV.
26. See infra Part Ill.
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Section I will highlight the historical background of the Smith-
Mundt Act and the changes it has seen over the years. To fully
understand why the domestic dissemination ban is so important, it is
helpful to first understand why it was created, and how and why it has
continuously evolved since its inception. Section II provides an analysis
of Gartner v. U.S. Information Agency,27 which involved several First
Amendment challenges to the domestic dissemination ban by an
American journalist. Considering Gartner involved a direct challenge to
28
the constitutionality of the ban, it is necessary to understand how the
court in that case ruled and on what basis it reached its decision. Section
III will then provide an analysis of cases involving the media's First
Amendment right to publish seemingly public information. This area of
law helps to solidify the argument that even with the domestic
dissemination ban in place, the First Amendment likely still protects the
press' right to domestically publish foreign news produced by U.S.
Government-controlled news organizations. Section IV focuses on the
press' First Amendment right of access arguments in favor of obtaining
such information. While some U.S.-produced foreign news is already
partially accessible today through the interception of foreign-bound
29
broadcasts and the Internet, Section IV will analyze First Amendment
case law involving the right of access in order to assess whether the
Constitution guarantees more access than is currently permitted. Finally,
Section V will conclude that the Smith-Mundt Act's domestic
dissemination ban may remain intact for certain important purposes,
while allowing the domestic flow of information that it purports to ban.
The conclusion that the ban may remain intact and still achieve a more
free press is where this Note seeks to separate itself from prior analysis
of the domestic dissemination ban. 30
27. 726 F. Supp. 1183 (S.D. Iowa 1989).
28. See id. at 1185.
29. See Essential Info., Inc. v. U.S. Info. Agency, 134 F.3d 1165, 1170 (D.C.
Cir. 1998) (Tatel, J., dissenting) (noting that there are already means for the general
public to obtain material that falls under the Smith-Mundt Act).
30. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
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I. HISTORY OF THE SMITH-MUNDT ACT AND ITS EFFECT ON CURRENT
U.S. DIPLOMACY
A. History of the Act
Broadcasting news to foreign countries is nothing new for the
United States Government.3 As early as 1940, certain countries in Latin
America began receiving "regularly scheduled" U.S. Government
32
broadcasts as part of the Government's diplomacy efforts. Additionally,
throughout World War II, the Office of War Information directed its
resources "at both the enemy and occupied territories." 33 Following
World War II, and at the outset of the Cold War, Congress passed the
Smith-Mundt Act "to promote a better understanding of the United States
in other countries." 34 Congress believed the Act was necessary because it
felt that the United States had previously "failed to systematically
promote itself to other nations" and such promotion was necessary as the
country engaged in a global ideological war with the Soviet Union. 35 The
Act established the framework for news services that would spread
information about the United States across the world and provide certain
countries with otherwise unavailable news.36 Not long after, in 1953, the
United States Information Agency (USIA) was chartered and given the
37primary responsibility of fulfilling the Smith-Mundt Act's purpose.
Interestingly, the original Smith-Mundt Act did not expressly
ban the domestic dissemination of government-produced, internationally
3 1. See David F. Stein, The Voice of America Case: A Challenge to a Federal
Information Statute, 12 COMM. & L. 49, 51 (1990).
32. Id. The broadcasts were carried out under the supervision of "Nelson
Rockefeller's Office of Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs." Id.
33. Gormly, supra note 19, at 194 n.22.
34. Pub. L. No. 80-402, ch. 36, tit. 1, §2, 62 Stat. 6 (1948) (codified as
amended at 22 U.S.C. § 1431 (2006)).
35. Palmer & Carter, supra note 16, at 7.
36. 22 U.S.C. § 1431 (2006). Today, Radio Free Europe, Radio Free Asia,
Radio Marti and TV Marti are all examples of stations that seek to provide foreign
audiences with coverage of "domestic events that they are denied by their own
media." BBG Fact Sheet, supra note 9.
37. See Stein, supra note 31, at 53 n.23 (citing the Reorganization Plan No. 8
of 1953).
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bound material.38 However, although there was not a de jure ban, a de
facto ban did exist; a reality noted by Congress' perceived need to pass
legislation in order to permit the domestic release of certain USIA
films. 39 Believing a de facto ban existed on domestic dissemination,
Congress felt it necessary to pass legislation in order to allow exceptions
for the public viewing of several USIA-produced films. 40 Evenutally,
subsequent events triggered an explicit statutory ban on the domestic
dissemination of USIA materials.41
Specifically, in 1972, Senator James Buckley requested to
broadcast a USIA film entitled Czechoslovakia 1968 during "his weekly
42
television report[]" to his constituents in New York. The Attorney
General at the time, Richard Kleindienst, gave a positive assessment of
the proposed release, stating that under the Act the press and members of
Congress were permitted to disseminate such material.43 Senator J.
William Fulbright, then Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, disagreed with this interpretation and sought to have an
express ban on the dissemination of USIA material placed into the Act.45
Senator Fulbright eventually succeeded in his endeavor by "attach[ing]
an amendment to the 1972 Foreign Relations Authorization Act" that
altered the Smith-Mundt Act to include an express ban on the domestic
46
dissemination of USIA material. A driving factor behind the 1972
Amendment was a desire to prevent the United States "government from
'propagandizing the American public' through its foreign news
38. 22 U.S.C. § 1431 (1946 & Supp. III 1946).
39. See Gormly, supra note 19, at 196 ("Congress found it necessary to pass
legislation permitting the domestic release of a USIA film on the life of President
John F. Kennedy, 'Years of Lightning, Day of Drums."').
40. Id.
41. See Berkowitz, supra note 21, at 276-77.
42. Id at 276. CZECHOSLOVAKIA 1968 was a short documentary film produced
by the USIA about the history of Czechoslovakia with a focus on the "Prague
Spring" of 1968. CZECHOSLOVAKIA 1968, THE INTERNET MOVIE DATABASE, http://
www.imdb.com/title/tt0064200/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2012). The film won the 1969
Academy Award for Best Documentary Short Subject. Id. (follow "See more
awards" hyperlink).
43. Berkowitz, supra note 21, at 276.
44. Id. at 276.
45. Id. at 276-77.
4 6. Id.
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services.47 Essentially, the fear was that without such a ban on domestic
dissemination, the U.S. Government could spread propaganda to the
American public. 48 Not far removed from World War II and Germany's
"anti-Jew and pro-Nazi propaganda," it is easy to understand why
legislators were sensitive to the possibility of the U.S. Government
spreading propaganda to its own citizens through agencies like the
USIA.4 9
The 1972 Amendment5 o altered a portion of the Act to state that
all information prepared by the United States under the Act for
distribution abroad "shall not be disseminated within the United
States."5  The newly revised provision did allow the press, student
researchers, and scholars to view the released materials at the State
Department any time after their release, but stipulated that reviews would
be "for examination only."5 2 The Amendment also contained an
exception to allow for the domestic distribution of the USIA-produced
journal, Problems of Communism. 53 The rationale behind allowing this
particular publication to be distributed domestically was that it would
"help[] educate the American public about the dangers of
Communism." 54
The domestic dissemination ban has remained in effect since its
enactment in 1972, with the exception of a slight alteration in 1990. 5
The 1990 Amendment5 6 established that twelve years after its
47. Essential Info., Inc. v. U.S. Info. Agency, 134 F.3d 1165, 1171 (D.C. Cir.
1998) (Tatel, J., dissenting) (quoting S. REP. No. 92-754, at 85 (1972)).
48. See Palmer & Carter, supra note 16, at 10-11.
49. See id. at 6 (discussing the American public's negative perception of
Germany's propaganda efforts, as well as the efforts of "censorship and
misinformation by the American government").
50. Pub. L. No. 92-352, tit. II, § 204, 86 Stat. 494 (1972) (current version at 22
U.S.C. § 1461(a) (2006)).
51. 22 U.S.C. § 1461 (Supp. V 1975).
52. Id. Members of Congress were also permitted to view the material "for
examination only" upon request. Id.
53. Berkowitz, supra note 21, at 277. Problems of Communism was a journal
that, at the time of the amendment, the Government Printing Office distributed some
5000 copies of annually. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 278.
56. Pub. L. No. 101-246, tit. 11, § 202, 104 Stat. 49 (1990) (codified as
amended at 22 U.S.C. § 1461 (2006)).
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dissemination or twelve years after its preparation, material created under
the Act is to be made "available to the Archivist of the United States, for
domestic distribution."57 Therefore, today, material prepared under the
Smith-Mundt Act may still not be disseminated within the United States
immediately after its foreign release, but scholars and journalists may
examine it before its eventual lawful release by the Archivist of the
United States.s8
B. The Current State of U.S. Diplomacy Under the Smith-Mundt Act
Although the United States Information Agency (USIA) no
longer exists, today, the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG)
continues its mission.59 The BBG took charge of "all government-
sponsored, non-military international broadcasting in 1994." 60 The BBG
is technically considered an independent agency, but is wholly funded by
the United States Government. 6 1 The influence the U.S. Government
exerts over the BBG is readily apparent in the composition of the
organization's board, which consists of eight members appointed by the
62President and confirmed by the Senate. The ninth member of the board
is the Secretary of State, who "serves ex officio." 63 The BBG essentially
functions as a parent organization that oversees and controls five distinct
U.S. broadcasting agencies, each having their own particular
geographical focus.
57. 22 U.S.C. § 1461 (2006). The 1990 amendment also added language to the
statute regarding reimbursing the USIA for material and allowing the Archivist to
charge reasonable fees for the distribution of that material. Id.
58. See id.
59. See Berkowitz, supra note 21, at 278-79.
60. Id. at 279.
61. See BBG Fact Sheet, supra note 9.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. The five broadcasters under the BBG's control are: "Voice of America
(VOA), Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), Radio Free Asia (RFA), Office
of Cuba Broadcasting (OCB; Radio and TV Marti), and Middle East Broadcasting
Networks, Inc. (MBN; Radio Sawa and Alhurra Television)." Id.
616 [Vol. 10
65
While the BBG has a general mission for all of its broadcasters, each
66
separate news agency has its own mission. These missions range from
providing news not covered by the media in certain foreign countries to
providing general international news injected with "coverage of the
67U.S." and its culture. What seems to be an undeniable fact is that with a
weekly audience of 165 million people worldwide in 2010, in fifty-nine
different languages, the BBG plays a significant role in the United
68
States' diplomacy efforts abroad. As such, the fact that the BBG has
such a massive reach further supports this Note's recognition that
Americans should have some oversight or knowledge of this large
program being conducted by their government.
Given the fact that the BBG represents such a powerful
information engine worldwide, the Smith-Mundt Act's domestic
dissemination ban raises some serious concerns. Specifically, an
argument can be made that American taxpayers who fund all aspects of
the BBG should have a right to view the material they are funding to be
made public everywhere in the world except for the United States.70
Similarly, another contention is that the American press should be able to
gather and provide this material to the public, as it usually would for
other matters, in order to fulfill its traditional role as a "watchdog" for
the American public.' These serious policy concerns arising from the
ban also implicate several important First Amendment questions: What
level of access to this information does the Constitution require? More
importantly, considering BBG materials have increasingly been made
65. See id The BBG's mission is "[t]o promote freedom and democracy and
enhance understanding through multimedia communication of accurate, objective,
and balanced news, information and other programming about America and the




69. See infra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
70. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
71. See Nick Gamse, Legal Remedies for Saving Public Interest Journalism in
America, 105 Nw. U. L. REV. 329, 336 (2011) (noting the importance of the First
Amendment in allowing the press to serve as "a watchdog to check the three
branches of the govemment").
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public through the Internet and other means,72 can the ban
constitutionally prohibit the American press from distributing such
seemingly public information to the American public?
The following sections will discuss and address these central
questions at length, beginning first with an examination of Gartner v.
U.S. Information Agency and its implications on the American press'
rights under the First Amendment.
II. GARTNER V. U.S. INFORMATIONAGENCY
To date, Gartner is the only published case to challenge the
constitutionality of the Smith-Mundt Act's domestic dissemination ban."
Specifically, Gartner invokes important First Amendment issues
involving the right to access and the right to domestically publish U.S.
Government-produced foreign news. 74 Thus, to fully analyze how other
First Amendment case law bears on the issue of the domestic
dissemination ban, as this Note will do in later sections, 75 it is important
to first assess how the court in Gartner analyzed the constitutionality of
the Act.
Gartner involved an action brought against the BBG's precursor
agency, the USIA, by journalist Michael Gartner,76 "a state legislator,
and a newspaper publishing company."77 The dispute resulted from a
letter response from a Voice of America78 official informing Gartner that
72. See Essential Info., Inc. v. U.S. Info. Agency, 134 F.3d 1165, 1170 (D.C.
Cir. 1998) (Tatel, J., dissenting) (noting that there are already means for the general
public to obtain BBG-produced material).
73. See Gartner v. U.S. Info.- Agency, 726 F. Supp. 1183, 1189 (S.D. Iowa
1989) (citing Smith v. USIA as an unpublished case that dealt with essentially the
same issues as Gartner); see also Smith v. USIA, No. C 76-483 (W.D. Wash. 1978).
74. See Gartner, 726 F. Supp. at 1185.
75. See infra Parts III and IV.
76. Michael Gartner has had an extensive career in journalism, including
several editorial roles with various newspapers. Michael Gartner, UNIV. OF IOWA,
http://www.uiowa.edu/-acadtech/joumalists/bios/gartner.html (last visited Apr. 12,
2012). The pinnacles of Gamter's career include serving as President of NBC News
from 1988 to 1993 and receiving the Pulitzer Prize for Editorial Writing in 1997. Id.
77. Gartner, 726 F. Supp. at 1185.
78. Voice of America is a news organization that is currently under the
purview of the Broadcasting Board of Governors. BBG Fact Sheet, supra note 9.
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he could not "'xerox' USIA materials and reprint them in his
newspapers." 79 The letter did not absolutely deny Gartner access to
USIA-produced material because a provision of the ban allows
journalists to review the material.80 However, the letter did deny Gartner
the right to make "verbatim copies" of the material. As a result of the
letter's prohibition, the plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that 22
U.S.C. §§ 146182 and 1461-la 8 3 violated their First Amendment rights by
banning "the plaintiffs from 'receiving and disseminating within the
United States information and materials disseminated abroad by the
[USIA]."'" While the plaintiffs seem to have alleged one general
infringement, the court bifurcated their complaint into two separate
85issues. According to the district court, the two issues raised in the case
were whether the domestic dissemination ban violated the plaintiffs'
First Amendment rights "to receive information" and "to disseminate
information. 86
A. The Right to Receive Information
In assessing whether the plaintiffs had a constitutional right to
make "verbatim copies" of USIA material, the court began with a broad
review and analysis of the First Amendment.87 The court was quick to
underscore that, while the First Amendment protects against government
infringement of certain rights, "it does not create an affirmative duty
upon the government to act." Essentially, the court suggested that the
First Amendment serves to protect certain rights from government
intrusion, but that it does not necessarily bestow upon the government
79. Gartner, 726 F. Supp. at 1192 n.13.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 1192.
82. 22 U.S.C. § 1461 (constituting a portion of the Smith-Mundt Act's
domestic dissemination ban).
83. 22 U.S.C. § 1461-la (constituting a portion of the Smith-Mundt Act's
domestic dissemination ban).
84. Gartner, 726 F. Supp. at 1185 (quoting Complaint at 3).
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. See id. at 1187-88.
88. Id.
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any specific duty to enhance those rights beyond what they already
guarantee. 89
Consistent with the fact that the First Amendment generally does
not impart affirmative duties upon the government,9 the court cited cases
noting that the government has no constitutional duty to provide access
to its own information.9 1 The court suggested that lacking any
constitutional duty to provide access to its files, the only such duties the
government owes are "'statutory in nature."' 92 The issue was ultimately a
question of the extent of access required, or in other words, whether the
plaintiffs had the right to make verbatim copies and thus easily reproduce
the material for media use.93 Ultimately, the court took a position in line
94with previous cases that suggested that the government has no
89. See id.
90. See id.
91. Id at 1188; see Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 9 (1978) (stating that
there is not a "right of access to all sources of information within government
control"); Wolfe v. Froehlke, 358 F. Supp. 1318, 1321 (D. D.C. 1973), aff'd per
curiam, 510 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (noting that the First Amendment does not
"impose an affirmative duty on the part of the Government . . . to disclose
Government files").
92. Gartner, 726 F. Supp. at 1188 (quoting Wolfe, 358 F. Supp. at 1321). In
stating there are statutory rights of access, the court is referring to the Freedom of
Information Act. See id.
93. See id. at 1188-90.
94. See Houchins, 438 U.S. at 15-16 (holding that the First Amendment does
not "mandate[] a right of access to government information or sources of
information within the government's control" and that due to such, journalists did
not have a constitutional right to full access to a jail and its inmates); Zemel v. Rusk,
381 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1965) (rejecting the plaintiffs argument that the First
Amendment permitted him to travel to Cuba in order to acquaint himself with their
culture by noting that the First Amendment "does not carry with it the unrestrained
right to gather information"); Capital Cities Media v. Chester, 797 F. 2d 1164, 1168-
71 (3d Cir. 1986) (en banc) (ruling that the First Amendment did not guarantee
plaintiff-newspapers the right to access environmental documents held by the
government of Pennsylvania); Gregg v. Barrett, 771 F.2d 539, 546 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
(holding there is no constitutional right to receive "verbatim transcript[s] of the
proceedings of Congress"); Wolfe, 358 F. Supp. at 1321 (ruling that the plaintiffs did
not have a constitutional right to access a file held by the Department of Defense);
Herald Co. v. McNeal, 511 F. Supp. 269, 273 (E.D. Miss. 1981) (three-judge court)
(finding that a newspaper did not have a First Amendment right to access certain
documents held by the government); Trimble v. Johnston, 173 F. Supp. 651, 655-56
620 [Vol. 10
constitutional duty to provide convenient access to its information or
even to provide access at all.95 Specifically, the court focused on Gregg
v. Barrett,96 where the court in that case held that the government has no
duty to provide "verbatim transcripts of congressional proceedings."9 '
Following its discussion of Gregg and other case law in the area,
the court rejected the plaintiffs argument that, as a result of their
statutory right to examine USIA material provided for in 22 U.S.C. §
1461,98 they also had a constitutional right to make "verbatim copies.'99
As the court maintained, the plaintiffs "[had] no first amendment right to
make verbatim copies of UISA materials at USIA offices.""0 While this
holding certainly has an impact on this Note's analysis of the domestic
dissemination ban, what proves to be most important is actually dicta
right before the court's decision. Before its ruling, the court notes that
there is nothing in the law that prevents someone from "obtain[ing]
verbatim transcripts of USIA broadcasts through less convenient
channels such as receiving the broadcasts in other countries.,,.o. This
language, coupled with the holding's specific location ban on "verbatim
copies,,102 suggests that while verbatim copies of BBG material may not
be made at BBG offices, they can be made anywhere else through other
means. Such a position serves as a foundation for this Note's argument
that the domestic dissemination ban actually has little legal effect on the
media's right to access and publish BBG material, because the court
expressly states that the obtainment of BBG materials through other
means would likely be lawful.os
(D. D.C. 1959) (deciding that absent a statutory right, the plaintiff had no
constitutional right to access certain Congressional records).
95. See Gartner, 726 F. Supp. at 1188-90.
96. 771 F.2d 539 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
97. Gartner, 726 F. Supp. at 1189 (citing Gregg, 771 F.2d at 548).
98. 22 U.S.C. § 1461(a) (2006).
99. Gartner, 726 F. Supp. at 1189.
100. Id. at 1190.
10 1. Id.
102. Id.
103. This proposition will be discussed later in this Note in the context of other
relevant case law. See infra Part IV.
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B. The Right to Disseminate Information
After ruling on the plaintiffs' right of access, the Gartner court
discussed whether the plaintiffs had a constitutional right to publish
USIA materials.1  However, the court's analysis of the constitutional
question was quickly derailed by jurisdictional issues. 105 The court noted
that for it to hear a case on the constitutional validity of a congressional
or executive action, the plaintiffs had to show that they had "sustained or
[are] immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of
the challenged statute or official conduct.,,106 Taking the standard under
consideration, the court decided, for several reasons, that the plaintiffs
lacked standing.107 The court stated that aside from the right of access
issue, "nothing in the record suggest[ed] that the [USIA] ha[d] taken any
action of any kind against the plaintiffs" in regards to their right to
publish USIA material.'os Notably, in one instance, Gartner did indeed
disseminate USIA materials by quoting them in a speech.109 In that
instance, the USIA never "punished [n]or threatened to punish"
Gartner1 0o Furthermore, as the court notes, the domestic dissemination
ban's statutory language does not even provide a means for criminal or
civil sanctions against violators. Considering there was no evidence of
punishment and no means for punishment, the court ruled that the
plaintiffs could not establish an injury or even an impending one. 112 That
the government was unwilling to punish Gartner for domestic
publication" 3 and that the statute does not even provide for such
punishment 1l4 further supports the argument that the domestic
dissemination ban has little to no power to prevent the domestic
publication of BBG materials.
104. See Gartner, 726 F. Supp. at 190.
105. See id.
106. Id. at 1191 (quoting Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923)).
107. See id. at 1191-95.





113. Id. at 1192.
114. Id. at 1193.
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After briefly dismissing the possibility of an injury through the
theory that the domestic dissemination ban caused a "chilling effect" on
publication, the court then addressed the plaintiff's argument that the
threat of being enjoined from publishing is injurious through the theory
of "prior restraints."" 5 The court, however, also dismissed this argument,
stating that the USIA never enjoined or indicated that it would enjoin the
plaintiffs from publishing its material in a newspaper.116 In fact, the
USIA itself stated that it believed it had no such power and that enjoining
such a publication would not be in accordance with the law. 117 Once
again, even though the court refused, due to a lack of standing, to address
the constitutional issue of the right to publish, the facts of the case show
a government that is ultimately unwilling to truly apply the domestic
dissemination ban." 8 This lack of government action further points to a
domestic dissemination ban that is practically, if not completely,
powerless against news organizations that choose to publish BBG
material within the United States.
The court's refusal to rule on the plaintiffs' right to publish
material under the ban is certainly frustrating for the purpose of this
Note's argument; a reality enhanced by the lack of other cases directly
challenging the right to publish under the Smith-Mundt Act. However,
the dicta in the court's decision does point clearly to a government that is
both unwilling to punish'19 or prevent the domestic publication of BBG
material.120 The dicta also presents a government that feels it is legally
unable to punish or prevent such publication anyways.121 When coupled
with the next section's analysis of relevant case law pertaining to the
right to publish, this lack of government enforcement indicates a





119. See supra notes 109-11, 114 and accompany text.
120. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
121. See supra notes 112, 118 and accompanying text.
122. See infra Part III.
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III. THE RIGHT OF THE PRESS TO PUBLISH BBG MATERIAL
In considering the decision in Gartner and the Smith-Mundt
Act's ban, the question of whether the press has a First Amendment right
123
to publish BBG material within the United States emerges. However,
there seems to be little question or dispute as to the importance of the
press' ability to review and provide this information to the American
public.124 This belief in the importance of the press is not just one held
today, but one that has been firmly established since the nation's
inception. 12 James Madison, one of the nation's founding fathers, noted
the importance of the press in explaining that the First Amendment
ensures that "'[t]he people shall not be deprived or abridged of their right
to speak, to write, or to publish their sentiments; and the freedom of the
press, as one of the great bulwarks of liberty, shall be inviolable.""2 6
Taking this into consideration, the significance of a free press weighs
heavily when considering the issue of what limits the Constitution
permits on the domestic publication of BBG material.
Based on a strong history of protection for the press, and the fact
that the world and the United States' diplomatic efforts therein are
becoming increasingly globalized, it is fair to argue that many Americans
will continue to want to know what their government is saying in other
countries on their behalf.127 Beyond traditional relations carried out by
diplomats, the news published by the BBG is a huge part of the United
States' diplomatic efforts.128 Of course, there are means, such as the
Internet, through which the American public can view some BBG-
123. See Gartner, 726 F. Supp. at 1190-95 (recognizing that there is a
question of whether the ban on domestic publication is constitutional, but ultimately
declining to rule on the issue for procedural reasons).
124. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
125. See Curtis Pub. Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 147 (1967) ("This carries out
the intent of the Founders who felt that a free press would advance 'truth, science,
morality, and arts in general' as well as responsible government." (quoting Letter to
the Inhabitants of Quebec, 1 Journals of the Continental Cong. 108)).
126. New York Times Co. v. U.S., 403 U.S. 713, 716 (1971) (emphasis added)
(quoting I ANNALS OF CONG. 434 (1789)).
127. See Warren 1. Cohen, Op-Ed, Secret Records Feed Mistrust, CHRISTIAN
SCIENCE MONITOR, Nov. 17, 1994, at 19 (opining that "[t]he historical documents of
US diplomacy should be open to public scrutiny").
128. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
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produced news on its own;129 a fact that suggests that, in a sense, BBG-
produced news is already public information.13 0 However, just because
the public has access to information does not obviate the traditional
desire to have a robust press that gathers the information, reviews it, and
publishes it for public consumption.13 As the Court in Cox Broadcasting
Corp. v. Cohnl32 noted, "in a society in which each individual has but
limited time and resources with which to observe at first hand the
operations of [their] government, [citizens rely] necessarily upon the
press to bring to [them] in convenient form the facts of those
operations." Therefore, while some BBG material may already be
accessible to the public, it is important for the press to be able to review
the large quantities of information and then provide it to the public in
"convenient form."' 34 By doing so, the press furthers the democratic
process by allowing citizens to make informed voting decisions about
U.S. diplomacy efforts and thus ensure a more effective government.35
In light of the importance of the press' ability to publish and
keep the citizenry well informed, the following discussion addresses
whether the press can publish BBG-produced information even with the
Smith-Mundt Act as current law. This issue can be best understood
through two primary considerations: (1) the government's ability to
civilly or criminally punish the press for publication under the Smith-
Mundt Act,136 and (2) the government's ability to restrain or prevent such
129. See Landler, supra note 13.
130. See id. (discussing ways in which BBG material may already be accessed
by the public).
131. See Mary-Rose Papandrea, Citizen Journalism and the Reporter's
Privilege, 91 MiNN. L. REv. 515, 522 (2007) (noting the importance of the media
and that the Supreme Court "has often recognized [its] important role ... in our
democracy").
132. 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
133. Id. at 491.
134. See id.
135. Id. at 492 ("Without the information provided by the press most of us and
many of our representatives would be unable to vote intelligently or to register
opinions on the administration of government generally.").
136. See Gartner v. U.S. Info. Agency, 726 F. Supp. 1183, 1192-93 (S.D. Iowa
1989) (discussing the government's power to punish publishers under the Smith-
Mundt Act).
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publication. 137 The subsequent sections, therefore, argue that the
government likely lacks the ability to punish or restrain publication, both
statutorily and constitutionally, and that the decision in Gartner only
furthers the proposition that the press may publish such information in
the United States. 3 8
A. Government's Ability to Punish Publication
1. Pre-Daily Mail Standard
Over the past fifty years, the United States Circuit Courts of
Appeal and the Supreme Court have consistently struck down state
statutes that made unlawful, or civilly or criminally punished the
publication of publicly available information.13 9 In these cases, when the
publisher obtained the information from some public source, the
Supreme Court has protected everything from the press' First
Amendment right to publish sexual assault victims' identitiesl40 to a
privacy advocate's right to publish other persons' full Social Security
137. See id. at 1193-94 (discussing the doctrine of prior restraints and the
government's ability to restrain or prevent the publication of BBG material).
138. See id. at 1190-95 (refusing for procedural reasons to take up the issue of
what ability the government has to prevent or punish publication, but seemingly
reasoning that if the Court were to take up the issue it would likely hold that the
government has little to no power).
139. See The Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 526 (1989) (declaring
unconstitutional the application of a Florida statute that made it unlawful to publish
the identity of a sexual offense victim); Smith v. Daily Mail Publ'g Co., 443 U.S. 97,
105-06 (1979) (finding unconstitutional the application of a West Virginia statute
that punished the publication ofjuvenile offenders' identities without court consent);
Landmark Commc'ns, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 843-44 (1978) (declaring
unconstitutional the application of a Virginia statute to punish reporters for
publishing information from closed judicial review hearings); Cox, 420 U.S. at 496
(declaring unconstitutional the application of a Georgia statute imposing civil
liability for the publication of a rape victim's name lawfully obtained from open
court proceedings); Ostergren v. Cuccinelli, 615 F.3d 263, 286-87, 289-90 (4th Cir.
2010) (declaring unconstitutional the application of a Virginia statute making it
unlawful to publish other persons' Social Security numbers).
140. Cox, 420 U.S. at 496-97.
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numbers on the Internet.141 Thus, even when considering the protection
of other important individual rights such as privacy rights, the Supreme
Court has emphasized its high regard for First Amendment guarantees
like the freedom of speech and the freedom of the press.
One of the early and important cases in this area of law was Cox
Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn.142 At issue in Cox Broadcasting was a
Georgia statute that made "it a misdemeanor to publish or broadcast the
name or identity of a rape victim."1 4 3 At the trial for the rape and murder
of seventeen-year-old Cynthia Cohn, a reporter for a Cox Broadcasting
Corp. television station uncovered Cohn's name by viewing the
indictments in the courtroom and then subsequently published her
name.144 It was an undisputed fact that these indictments were available
for inspection as public records.145 As a result of this publication, the
victim's father, the appellee, brought suit under the Georgia statute
against the television station's owner, claiming "that his right to privacy
had been invaded."1 46
The Supreme Court, on appeal, narrowed the issue to "whether
[a] State may impose sanctions on the accurate publication of the name
of a rape victim obtained from public records," specifically from judicial
records "open to public inspection."1 4 7 In the Court's view, the issue
came down to weighing public interests against important constitutional
148
rights. The tension there existed between the state's interest in privacy
and the First Amendment guarantees of a free press and freedom of
speech. 149 Favoring the importance of the freedom of the press in this
specific case, the Court focused primarily on (1) the truthfulness of the
published story and (2) the openness of the information in the case. so
First, the Court noted that considering "truth [is] recognized as a
141. Ostergren, 615 F.3d at 286-87.
142. 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
143. Id at 472.
144. Id at 472-74.
145. Id. at 473-74.
146. Id. at 474 (noting that the particular claim was a 'tort of public
disclosure' (quoting Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 200 S.E.2d 127, 128 (Ga. 1973))).
147. Id. at 491.
148. See id. at 491-94.
149. See id.
150. See id.
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defense" in defamation actions, the truthfulness of the article at issue
strengthened the validity of publication."' The Court then recognized
that, considering "privacy fade[s] when the information involved already
appears on the public record," there seemed to be little public interest in
upholding privacy rights in such a case.152 Essentially, the Court
reasoned that, when information is already available to the public,
privacy rights tend to yield to First Amendment rights. 53 Considering the
competing interests between a free press and privacy rights, the Court
held that "States may not impose sanctions on the publication of truthful
information contained in official court records open to public
inspection."' 
54
The framework used in Cox Broadcasting was partially followed
three years later in Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia.55 In
Landmark, the Court found that, under the United States Constitution, a
Virginia statute could not punish a newspaper for publishing information
from a judicial review session its reporters attended, even though the
session was required to be confidential under Virginia law.156 Although
the Court ultimately decided the statute's constitutionality through a
"clear and present danger" test,' 57 the Court did recognize some of Cox
Broadcasting's factors such as the truthfulness of the information being
published '" and the weighing of interests. Even though the Supreme
Court eventually adopted a general standard for cases like these,160 these
decisions exhibit the judiciary's long-founded unwillingness to punish
the publication of truthful information when that information is already
publicly available in some form. Therefore, even without the Court's
151. Id at 490. The Court, however, "carefully left open the question whether
the First and Fourteenth Amendments require that truth be recognized as a defense in
a defamataion action brought by a private person as distinguished from a public
official or public figure." Id.
152. Id. at 494-95.
153. See id.
154. Id. at 495 (emphasis added).
155. 435 U.S. 829 (1978).
156. Id. at 849.
157. See id. at 845.
158. See id. at 840.
159. See id. at 841-42.
160. See infra Parts III.A.2-3.
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current standard of review,'61 it seems that precedent has long been on
the side of publishing BBG material in the United States so long as the
publication is accurate and the information is derived from an already
accessible public source.
2. Daily Mail Standard
It was not until Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co.162 that the
Court truly established a coherent standard to be applied in cases
involving the publication of publicly available information.163 Daily Mail
considered the constitutionality of two West Virginia statutes, as applied
to the particular case, regarding the publication of a juvenile defendant's
name in a newspaper report. Specifically, West Virginia Code § 49-7-
3 made it unlawful to publish the name of a juvenile defendant without
a written court orderl66 and § 49-7-20 criminally punished such
infractions as misdemeanors. 67
The case arose from a school shooting in which a fourteen year-
old student shot a fifteen-year-old classmate. Shortly after the
shooting, reporters working for "[t]he Charleston Daily Mail and the
Charleston Gazette" arrived on scene to document the event.169 While at
the school, the reporters learned the name of the alleged shooter, and
future juvenile defendant, from the police and "an assistant prosecuting
attorney" on the scene."o Although the Charleston Daily Mail initially
withheld the story due to knowledge of the West Virginia statutes
referenced above, 17 1 a decision was eventually made to publish an article
161. See id.
162. 443 U.S. 97 (1979).
163. See id. at 104.
164. See id. at 98-100.
165. W. VA. CODE § 49-7-3 (1979).
166. Id.
167. W. VA. CODE § 49-7-20 (1979). In the absence of punishment
"specifically provided," the stipulated penalty for conviction is a fine "not less than
ten nor more than one hundred dollars," or a jail sentence "not less than five day nor
more than six months," or both. 1d.
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listing the juvenile shooter's name after the Charleston Gazette did so.172
As a result of this publication, a grand jury returned an indictment
alleging that the defendant-newspapers had knowingly published the
student's name in violation of § 49-7-3.173 The newspapers petitioned the
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals for a writ of prohibition against
the prosecutor and the circuit court judge, alleging that the application of
the statute violated their First Amendment rights. 174 The court issued the
writ of prohibition, holding that the statute did infringe upon their rights
"as a prior restraint on speech."17 1
In its decision, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the argument
that the statute should be held unconstitutional as a prior restraint, but
noted that such a finding did not end its inquiry.176 Relying on precedent
recently established in Cox Broadcasting and Landmark,177 the Court
held that the application of the statute in this instance was an
unconstitutional infringement of the defendant-newspapers' First
Amendment rights.' In reaching its decision, the Court established a
standard that is still followed by courts when deciding cases involving
punishment for the publication of publicly available information. 179 The
Daily Mail standard states "that if [an entity] lawfully obtains truthful
information about a matter of public significance then state officials may
not constitutionally punish publication of the information, absent a need
to further a state interest of the highest order.",o In this case, the Court
felt that while the state presented an important state interest (the
172. Id. at 99-100.
173. Id. at 100.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. See id at 101-03 (noting that traditionally prior restraints occur when a
publication is enjoined and that such has not occurred here).
177. See id. (discussing the recent decisions in Cox Broadcasting and
Landmark).
178. Id. at 103-04. The Court does not invalidate the law as a whole, rather it
just considers its application in regards to the Daily Mail Publishing Company as
invalid. Id. at 105.
179. See, e.g., Ostergren v. Cuccinelli, 615 F.3d 263, 274-76 (4th Cir. 2010);
Constitutional Law-First Amendment-Fourth Circuit Holds That Republishing
Social Security Numbers Gleanedfrom Online Public Records Is Protected Speech. -
Ostergren v. Cuccinelli, 615 F3d 263 (4th Cir. 2010), 124 HARV. L. REv. 616, 618
(2010) (noting that other cases have used the Daily Mail standard).
180. Daily Mail, 443 U.S. at 103 (emphasis added).
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anonymity of juvenile offenders), ultimately it was insufficient to justify
the statute's punishment of the newspapers' publication of truthful
information that was obtained through lawful means. 18 Essentially, the
standard defined by the Court calls for a balancing test that weighs state
and public interests against the constitutional rights of those affected by
such statutes.182 Understanding this standard and how it is applied is
crucial in judging whether the government could constitutionally punish
any person or entity for publishing BBG material in the United States.
3. Application of the Daily Mail Standard
According to a later case, The Florida Star v. B.J.F., the Daily
Mail standard is supported by "three separate considerations" that are all
anchored in the "overarching 'public interest, secured by the
Constitution, in the dissemination of truth."'8 The first of those
considerations is that, since the Daily Mail standard only protects
publication of lawfully obtained information, the government still has
185
"ample means" by which to safeguard important state interests. In
other words, since the standard only protects lawfully obtained
information, the government can take measures to ensure that the
acquisition of certain privately-held information is unlawful and can
make unlawful the attainment of properly safeguarded information that is
within the government's control.186 Therefore, under the standard, if the
acquisition of the information is unlawful in the first place, a news
organization could be punished for publishing it.
The second consideration supporting the standard is "that
punishing the press for its dissemination of information which is already
publicly available is relatively unlikely to advance the interests in the
181. Id. at 105-06.
182. See id. at 104.
183. 491 U.S. 524 (1989).
184. Id. at 533 (quoting Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491 (1975))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
185. Id. at 534.
186. See id. For example, if the information is within the government's
possession it can still control its acquisition by classifying it or allowing redacted
releases. Id.
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service of which the State seeks to act."' 8 7 Stated differently, when the
published information is already open to the public, a state's interest to
keep it private has already been overridden. Once the state's interest
has been defeated, it seems purposeless to punish anyone for further
disseminating the public information, and thus the standard does little
harm by protecting the publisher of such information.
The third consideration underlying the Daily Mail standard "is
the 'timidity and self-censorship' which may result from allowing the
media to be punished for publishing . . . truthful information."' 89 The
Court believes that, absent a standard providing protection in certain
circumstances, the news media will be deterred from publication and will
censor itself out of fear of punishment.' 9 0 Therefore, the standard helps to
preserve the role of the press by creating a system whereby the media
may publish public information without fear of reprisal.191
Beyond noting the three bedrock considerations supporting the
Daily Mail standard, the Court explained that the standard should be
divided into two separate inquiries for courts to address.192 The first
inquiry focuses on "whether the [publisher] 'lawfully obtain[ed] truthful
information about a matter of public significance."" 9 3 This step focuses
on whether the State took any measure to ban or limit the "receipt of
information" and if the information was obtained in contravention of
such measures.' 94 Taking into consideration a state's applicable law,
courts should decide whether or not the particular receipt of information
was lawful.'95 If the information was truthful and lawfully obtained,
courts will proceed to the next step to determine whether punishment is
187. Id at 535.
188. See id.
189. Id (quoting Cox Broad., 420 U.S. at 496).
190. Id.
191. See id.
192. See id. at 536-37.
193. Id. at 536 (quoting Smith v. Daily Mail Publ'g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103
(1979)).
194. Id at 536. Essentially, the issue is whether the published material was
obtained lawfully. See id. The Court notes that just because "state officials are not
required to disclose [information] does not make it unlawful for a newspaper to
receive them when furnished by the government." Id.
195. See id.
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justified by a state interest.' 96 Of course, if the information was
unlawfully obtained or untruthful, the inquiry would end there and
punishment would be justified.
The second inquiry of the Daily Mail standard is whether
punishing publication "serves 'a need to further a state interest of the
highest order."'198 This portion of the standard calls on courts to balance
state interests against First Amendment rights, maintaining a sense of
deference to constitutional rights in the absence of compelling
interests.199 As recognized by the Fourth Circuit in Ostergren v.
Cuccinelli,200 what constitutes a state interest of the highest order should
be established objectively by the court.20 1 In other words, courts should
not "be bound by 'the State's view' as to what rises to the level of such
an important interest and should assess the interest objectively.202
If a court does not find an interest of the highest order,
punishment is not justified and thus is considered an infringement of
First Amendment rights.203 However, even where the court does find an
important interest, punishment must still be narrowly tailored to serve the
interest.204 As highlighted by the previously listed considerations, there is
a strong presumption against narrow tailoring when the government
relies on punishment as a means to serve its interest, considering that
other measures could properly have been taken to avoid disclosure in the
205
first place. Augmenting this presumption is the fact that, when
information is already available, a law designed to prevent publication
196. See id.
197. See id.
198. Id at 537 (quoting Daily Mail, 443 U.S. at 103).
199. See id.
200. 615 F.3d 263 (4th Cir. 2010).
201. See id at 277. The court in Ostergren notes that what is objectively a
state interest of the highest order can be partially determined through review of what
other states have or have not done to protect such an interest. See id. For example, in
another case a Florida statute requiring secrecy in certain situations was not justified
by a state interest of the highest order when the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
and 35 states did not also require secrecy in similar situations. Id. (citing Butterworth
v. Smith, 494 U.S. 624, 625 (1990)).
202. Id. at 277 (quoting Ostergren v. McDonnell, CIV. A. 3:08CV362, 2008
WL 3895593, at 10 (E.D. Va. Aug. 22, 2008)).
203. Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 537-41.
204. See id.
205. See id. at 538.
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through punishment is no longer serving its purpose since the
206
information is already available in some form. Therefore, when the
first step of the inquiry is fulfilled and the law is either not justified by an
interest of the highest order or is not narrowly tailored to serve such an
interest, punishment will be considered unconstitutional. 20 7
How this standard is applied is of great importance in
understanding the government's ability-or lack thereof-to punish the
domestic publication of BBG material. As shown in the next section,
BBG material can be lawfully obtained, would most likely be truthfully
208
published, and involves matters of public significance. Therefore, even
if weighed against state interests of the highest order, it seems likely that
the government could not punish the publication of BBG material209 even
210
though the Smith-Mundt Act purports to ban such publication.
4. Ability to Punish Under the Smith-Mundt Act
As highlighted in Gartner, on its surface, the Smith-Mundt Act's
ban on dissemination "is neither a criminal statute nor one that provides
for civil sanctions." 2 11 It could be argued that this should end this Note's
analysis of the ability of the government to punish publishers because, if
the statute does not provide for a criminal sanction or private remedy,
neither may be imposed.12 While this is true in regards to criminal
punishment for publication, it does not preclude any private remedy that
could be taken against a publisher.213 As seen in Cox Broadcasting, even
when a statute does not specifically provide for a private remedy, courts
have been willing to entertain one based on a statute's prohibition on
206. See id.
207. Id. at 541.
208. See infra Part III.A.4.
209. See infra Part III.A.4.
210. 22 U.S.C. §§ 1461, 1461-la (2006).
211. Gartner v. U.S. Info. Agency, 726 F. Supp. 1183, 1193 (S.D. Iowa 1989).
212. See 22 U.S.C. §§ 1461, 1461-la (neither providing a criminal nor civil
penalty for the publication of BBG material within the United States).
213. However, just because there is not a criminal sanction in place now, that
does not mean Congress could not create one. If this were the case, the
constitutionality of such a sanction would be addressed under the same standard that
is used in the following analysis of civil sanctions.
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214
publication. Taking this into consideration, the following discussion
provides an analysis of whether such a civil sanction on publication, or a
future properly-enacted criminal sanction, could survive under the Daily
Mail standard.
Under the first step of the Daily Mail standard, the question
would be "whether the [publisher] 'lawfully obtain[ed] truthful
information about a matter of public significance."'215 So long as a
publisher of BBG-produced material lawfully obtained the information
and published it verbatim or in a non-misleading way, it would seem that
this step of the inquiry is positively met.216 To lawfully obtain the
information, the press can receive the information through methods such
as the use of the Internet or through receiving BBG broadcasts in foreign
countries.217 As noted in Florida Star, one rationale underlying the
standard's inquiry into whether information was lawfully obtained is that
the government still has means by which to make the attainment of such
information unlawful.218 In essence, if the government made obtaining
BBG material unlawful in of itself, it could justify punishment of its
publication under this standard.219 In the case of the Smith-Mundt Act,
however, the government has chosen to prohibit dissemination of such
information, not the mere obtainment of it.220 Therefore, it seems
221
obtaining BBG material would currently be lawful under the standard.
However, this does not preclude the possibility that someday the
government might choose to make the mere obtainment of BBG news
214. See Cox Broad. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 474-75 (1975).
215. The Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 536 (1989) (quoting Smith v.
Daily Mail Publ'g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979)).
216. See id.
217. See Essential Info., Inc. v. U.S. Info. Agency, 134 F.3d 1165, 1170 (D.C.
Cir. 1998) (Tatel, J., dissenting). News organizations can gather the information by
receiving television and radio broadcasts and access other information through the
Internet. Id.
218. Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 534.
219. See id.
220. See 22 U.S.C. §§ 1461, 1461-la (2006).
221. See Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 534 (noting that the government can still
punish the publication of material if it chooses to make the attainment of such
material unlawful).
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unlawful and thus be able to punish its publication in accordance with the
standard.222
Another facet of the first inquiry that could easily be satisfied by
the media is producing truthful reports, as required by the standard.223
Press standards already call for truthful reporting, 22 4 so it would hardly
be a deviation from common practice for the media to accurately report
225BBG materials. Of course, if a news outlet were to vary the
information or distort it, the information would not be truthful and its
publication could be punished since the standard only provides
protection from punishment for the publication of "truthful
information." 26
Additionally, one must consider the issue under the first inquiry
of the standard as to whether the publication of BBG material could be
deemed "a matter of public significance." 2 27 In Daily Mail and Florida
Star, the Supreme Court found that certain trial information relating to
"the commission, and investigation, of . .. violent crime[s]" are matters
of public importance.228 Furthermore, in Ostergren, the Fourth Circuit
considered the publication of social security numbers to be "'a matter of
public significance' because it involved a criticism of Virginia's lack of
229proper redaction policies for public records. While the publication of
BBG material does not involve important privacy rights or criminal trial
processes, it does involve a news agency funded by the government that
has substantial influence across the world.230 If a single victim's identity
from one crime out of many is a matter of significance, as it was in Cox
231
Broadcasting, it would seem logical that the material produced by a
222. See id.
223. Id. at 536 (1989) (quoting Smith v. Daily Mail Publ'g Co., 443 U.S. 97,
103 (1979)).
224. See, e.g., The Associated Press Statement ofNews Values and Principles,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, http://www.ap.org/newsvalues/index.html (last visited Apr. 12,
2012).
225. See id.
226. Daily Mail, 443 U.S. at 103.
227. Id.
228. Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 525; see Daily Mail, 443 U.S. at 107.
229. Ostergren v. Cuccinelli, 615 F.3d 263, 276 (4th Cir. 2010) (quoting Daily
Mail, 443 U.S. at 103).
230. See BBG Fact Sheet, supra note 9.
231. See Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 475 (1975).
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news agency receiving over $758.9 million dollars from the U.S.
government in 2010232 would be deemed "a matter of public
significance."233 Therefore, the domestic publication of BBG material
should pass the first inquiry of the Daily Mail standard as being "a matter
of public significance."
The next step under Daily Mail would be to determine whether
punishing publication "serves 'a need to further a state interest of the
highest order."'234 Whether a court would find punishment of such a
publication to serve such an important state interest is a matter open to
debate. Among the many state interests the government could propose as
its justification, it might posit that punishment is necessary to deter BBG
235
material from spreading to the public as propaganda. While it is pure
speculation as to what state interest the government might put forward to
justify punishment, it seems logical that this might be a stated interest
since a driving force behind the enactment of the ban was to prevent
government propaganda.236 Regardless, a court could consider any
number of state interests and decide within its discretion whether any rise
to the level of "'a state interest of the highest order."'
237
Whether or not a court was to find a substantial state interest,
punishment would still almost certainly be considered unconstitutional
under the second inquiry of the standard due to a lack of narrow
tailoring.238 As noted in Florida Star, when the government chooses to
punish publication of already available material, there is a strong
232. See BBG Fact Sheet, supra note 9.
233. Daily Mail, 443 U.S. at 103.
234. The Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 537 (1989) (quoting Daily Mail,
443 U.S. at 103).
235. See Essential Info., Inc. v. U.S. Info. Agency, 134 F.3d 1165, 1171 (D.C.
Cir. 1998) (Tatel, J., dissenting) (noting that a force behind the domestic
dissemination ban was "to prevent the government from 'propagandizing the
American public"' (quoting S. REP. No. 92-754, at 85 (1972))).
236. See id.
237. See Ostergen v. Cuccinelli, 615 F.3d 263, 276-77 (4th Cir. 2010)
(quoting Daily Mail, 443 U.S. at 103) (discussing the discretionary process courts
should apply when deciding whether a state interest is sufficient under the Daily
Mail standard).
238. See id. at 280-87 (discussing how the state statute punishing release of
certain information was not sufficiently narrowly tailored to the asserted state
interest, as required by the Daily Mail standard).
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presumption against proper narrow tailoring to the stated interest.239
Here, the government would face the problem of narrow tailoring if any
240of its stated interests relied on the secrecy of BBG information. If the
government wishes to prevent dissemination, a less restrictive alternative
would be to prevent the obtainment of information or make obtainment
241unlawful in the first place. In addition to being overly harsh compared
to other effective applications of law, punishment would hardly seem to
serve any defined interest in secrecy because the material being
published is already somewhat accessible.242 Therefore, even if any
interest in secrecy were considered an important state interest, it seems
highly unlikely that punishment could pass a narrow tailoring analysis
243since there are less restrictive means than punishment and because
punishment would not even ensure the secrecy of BBG material since it
is already somewhat publicly accessible.244 Having failed to satisfy the
second inquiry of the standard, any punishment of publication under the
Smith-Mundt Act would likely be considered unconstitutional under the
Supreme Court's decision in Daily Mail. Absent the ability to enjoin
245publication as is discussed in the next section, the government is likely
powerless under the Constitution to restrain the domestic publication of
BBG material.
239. See Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 538.
240. See id. at 537-40 (finding that punishment was not narrowly tailored to
meet the government interest of secrecy when the disclosed information had already
been made public by the government).
241. See id. at 534 (discussing the government's options for controlling the
publication of materials through other laws).
242. See Essential Info., Inc. v. U.S. Info. Agency, 134 F.3d 1165, 1170 (D.C.
Cir. 1998) (Tatel, J., dissenting) (noting that there are already means for the general
public to obtain BBG-produced material).
243. See supra notes 236-42 and accompanying text.
244. See Essential Info., 134 F.3d at 1170 (noting that there are already means
for the general public to obtain BBG-produced material).
245. See infra Part III.B.
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B. Government's Ability to Restrain Publication
1. The Doctrine of Prior Restraints
Whereas the courts have been extremely reluctant to consider
civil or criminal punishment of publications constitutional,246 they have
been even more reluctant to find government restraints on publication as
constitutionally permissible uses of authority. 24 7 As the Supreme Court
stated in Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, "if it can be said that a
threat of criminal or civil sanctions after publication 'chills' speech, prior
restraint 'freezes' it ..... "248 Not surprisingly, the Court has stated and
consistently held that "it is the chief purpose of the guaranty [of a free
press] to prevent previous restraints upon publication." 249
In general, "[t]he term 'prior restraint' is used 'to describe
administrative and judicial orders forbidding certain communications
when issued in advance of the time that such communications are to
246. See supra Part II.B.1-3.
247. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 568-70 (1976) (finding
unconstitutional a gag order by a judge to limit trial publicity, even when the trial
was heavily publicized in a small community of only 850 people, thus indicating
serious threats to the defendant's right to an impartial jury); N.Y. Times Co. v.
United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (finding unconstitutional an injunction
preventing "the New York Times and the Washington Post from publishing the
contents of a classified study entitled 'History of U.S. Decision-Making Process on
Viet Nam Policy'"); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 705 (1931) (declaring
unconstitutional an ordinance that allowed for temporary and permanent enjoinder of
the publication of "malicious, scandalous and defamatory matter[s]," even when
truthful); Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Court for Cent. Dist. of Cal., 729
F.2d 1174, 1183-84 (9th Cir. 1984) (declaring unconstitutional an injunction
preventing CBS from publishing police surveillance tapes from the investigation of a
well-known defendant that was on trial at the time).
248. Nebraska Press Ass'n, 427 U.S. at 559. The Court has said that "[b]ehind
the distinction [between punishment and prior restraints] is a theory deeply etched in
our law: a free society prefers to punish the few who abuse rights of speech after
they break the law than to throttle them and all others beforehand." Southeastern
Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 559 (1975).
249. Near, 283 U.S. at 713. The Supreme Court has stated that "prior restraints
on speech and publication are the most serious and the least tolerable infringement
on First Amendment rights." Nebraska Press Ass 'n, 427 U.S. at 559.
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occur."' 25 0 While this term is generally inclusive, a better understanding
of the law of prior restraints comes from the seminal case, Near v.
251
Minnesota. In Near, the Supreme Court considered the
constitutionality of an ordinance allowing temporary and permanent
252injunctions against speech falling under certain parameters.
Specifically, if a news organization was found to have published or have
in its possession a "newspaper, magazine, or other periodical" that was
"(a) . . . obscene, lewd and lascivious" or "(b) . . . malicious, scandalous
and defamatory," that news organization could be prosecuted for a
211nuisance and enjoined from further publication of similar material.
The "nuisance" in Near involved a series of articles published by
Jay M. Near alleging that a Jewish gangster was largely in control of the
City of Minneapolis and that the gangster had support from various
254
public officials, including the chief of police and the City's mayor.
Finding the articles to be "malicious, scandalous and defamatory," a trial
court fined Near and enjoined him from publishing any future articles of
255
such nature. Near appealed the decision, alleging, in part, that the law
256was unconstitutional on its face.
On appeal, the Supreme Court agreed, finding the statute to be
an unconstitutional "infringement of the liberty of the press guaranteed
by the Constitution." 257 The Court noted that throughout history the most
important guarantee of the freedom of the press has been that the press
shall not be restrained from publication, even where such publication
may be "malicious, scandalous and defamatory." 25 8 Whereas actions of
259
libel still may lie in untruthful reporting, restraints on publication
altogether seem too extreme in the view of the Constitution.260 While the
250. Alexander v. U.S., 509 U.S. 544, 550 (1993) (quoting MELVILLE B.
NIMMER, NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH: TREATISE ON THEORY OF FIRST
AMENDMENT § 4.03, at 4-14 (1984) (emphasis added by Court)).
251. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
252. Id. at 702.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 703-04.
255. Id. at 703-06.
256. Id. at 706.
257. Id at 723.
258. See id. at 713-15.
259. See id. at 711.
260. See id. at 711-13.
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Court ruled strongly against the imposition of prior restraints, it did
261
assert that there is a limit to the protection against prior restraints.
However, this limit to protection is "recognized only in exceptional
cases," such as preventing the publication of "sailing dates of transports
or the number and location of troops." 26 2
Since the decision in Near, courts have consistently recognized
263
the lack of constitutional basis for the imposition of prior restraints.
When assessing the validity of prior restraints, courts begin their analysis
with "'a heavy presumption against [a prior restraint's] constitutional
validity."'264 Keeping that presumption in mind, "[tlhe Government . .
'carries a heavy burden of showing justification for the imposition of
such a restraint."' 265 While the courts have never articulated a specific
burden that must be met, they have held it to be a heavy one and, at
times, engaged in discussion akin to traditional narrow tailoring
266 267
analysis. For example, in Nebraska Press Association, the Supreme
Court considered "whether other measures" could fulfill the
government's interest and "how effective[ ] a restraining order" is to
serve that interest.268 This type of scrutiny is found in traditional narrow
tailoring inquiries, where the court asks if there is a less restrictive means
to achieve a government interest and whether the means are designed to
effectively serve that interest.269 Regardless of what precise analysis a
261. Id. at 716.
262. Id. at 716. The Court also mentions other rare exceptions where prior
restraints may be valid. Id. These instances include restraining the publication of
obscene materials, words of force, and other incitements of violence. id.
263. See infra notes 264-69 and accompanying text.
264. N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (quoting
Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963)).
265. Id. (quoting Org. for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971)).
266. See, e.g., Neb. Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 562 (1976).
267. 427 U.S. 539, 562 (1976).
268. Id. In the precursor case to N.Y Times Co. v. United States, the D.C.
Circuit of the U.S. Court of Appeals engaged in a similar analysis. See United States
v. Wash. Post Co., 446 F.2d 1327, 1329 (D.C. Cir. 1971) aff'd sub nom. N. Y. Times
Co. v. U.S., 403 U.S. 713 (1971). In Wash. Post Co., the court struck down the
injunction noting both the heavy presumption against prior restraints and that such
an injunction hardly served as "effective relief' since disclosures had already been
made. Id.
269. See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622, 661-62 (1994)
(applying a traditional narrow tailoring analysis).
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court chooses to use, it is clear that (1) prior restraints come to courts
with a strong presumption against them and (2) the government will have
a heavy burden in justifying such a restraint.270
2. Ability to Restrain Under the Smith-Mundt Act
When reviewing the history of prior restraints cases, it seems
highly unlikely that the government could constitutionally restrain the
press from publishing BBG-produced material.271 This is especially
evident considering the courts have been unwilling to validate prior
restraints even to protect important government interests such as national
security272 and defendants' constitutional rights to a fair trial and
273
impartial jury. Nevertheless, the constitutional validity of such a
restraint would still be subject to the same constitutional analysis as is
present in other cases involving prior restraints.274 Under that analysis, a
prohibition on publication of BBG materials would almost certainly be
considered a prior restraint, whether it came in the form of an
275administrative order, a judicial order, restraining order, injunction, or a
statutory provision.276 If found to be a prior restraint, the restriction
would be assessed with a "heavy presumption against its constitutional
validity."277 Keeping this strong presumption in mind, a court would then
have to determine whether the government could meet its "heavy burden
of showing justification for the imposition of [the] restraint."278 As
demonstrated below, there are multiple reasons why the government
would unlikely be able to meet such a burden in justifying a ban on
publication of BBG material.
First, such a ban would likely not involve any of Near's limited
proposed exceptions to prior restraints in which the First Amendment
270. See supra notes 264-65 and accompanying text.
271. See supra Part III.B.1 (discussing the doctrine of prior restraints).
272. See N. Y Times Co., 403 U.S. at 714.
273. See Neb. Press Ass'n, 427 U.S. at 570; Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. U.S.
Dist. Court for Cent. Dist. of Cal., 729 F.2d 1174, 1183-84 (9th Cir. 1984).
274. See supra notes 264-70 and accompanying text.
275. See Nimmer, supra note 250, at 4-14.
276. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
277. Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963).
278. Org. for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971).
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would not guarantee protection.279 Next, considering that other case law
addressing prior restraints has invalidated the restraints even in the face
280
of important government interests and individual constitutional rights,
it seems that the government's justification would pale in comparison
here since only information that is already available to parts of the public
is at stake.281 Finally, even if the government did establish a sufficient
interest, it seems unlikely that a restraint on publication would be
sufficiently narrowly tailored to serve such an interest. As noted in both
Nebraska Press and United States v. Washington Post, when information
is already partially available to the public, it hardly seems that a
restriction on its further publication effectively serves the government's
282
interest in non-disclosure. The government would face the same issue
here as BBG material is already somewhat available through the Internet
283
and other means such as intercepting radio and television broadcasts.
Considering that the government would unlikely be able to
provide sufficient justification for a restraint on publication, it seems
probable that such a restraint would thus fail under the doctrine of prior
restraints. This fact is magnified by the notion that the government would
most likely not seek to enjoin or prevent publication of BBG material
284
anyways. In Gartner, the court did not address the issue of prior
restraints because one had not been imposed, but the court did note that
the government felt it lacked the power to enjoin or restrain the
279. Publication would likely not involve obscene material, words of force, or
information on troop locations. See Near, 283 U.S. at 716. However, if publication
did involve any of these scenarios, it might not be protected by the First Amendment
and therefore a restriction might be constitutionally valid. See id.
280. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. United States., 403 U.S. 713 (1971)
(allowing publication of military documents against the government's national
security interests).
281. See Essential Info., Inc. v. U.S. Info. Agency, 134 F.3d 1165, 1170 (D.C.
Cir. 1998) (Tatel, J., dissenting) (noting that there are already means for the general
public to obtain BBG-produced material).
282. See Neb. Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 570 (1976); United States v.
Wash. Post Co., 446 F.2d 1327, 1329 (D.C. Cir. 1971) aff'd sub nom. N.Y. Times
Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
283. See Essential Info., 134 F.3d at 1170 (noting that there are already means
for the general public to obtain BBG-produced material).
284. See Gartner v. U.S. Info. Agency, 726 F. Supp. 1183, 1194-95 (S.D. Iowa
1989) (discussing that the government felt it lacked the legal authority to restrain the
domestic publication of USIA material).
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dissemination of USIA material.285 This government-held notion that it
has no power to restrain or enjoin,286 coupled with the fact that such a
restraint would nevertheless likely fail constitutional scrutiny,287
indicates that there is little the government could do to prevent the
widespread domestic publication of BBG material, even with a statute
that seemingly prohibits such publication.
IV. PRESS' RIGHT TO ACCESS BBG MATERIAL
As the above analysis indicates, it is highly unlikely that the
Smith-Mundt Act's ban on domestic dissemination can be applied to
prevent the press from publishing BBG material or punish it for doing
so.288 However, even if the government has little control over the press'
domestic publication of BBG material, does the press itself have a
constitutional right or statutory right under the Freedom of Information
Act289 (FOIA) to access the material in the first place?
As has been stated throughout, the press does already have some
access to BBG material. News organizations can receive BBG television
broadcasts originating in southern Florida bound for Cuba, they can
access information through the Internet, or they can actually receive the
information in a foreign country.290 Furthermore, the Smith-Mundt Act
itself does provide that "examination only" viewing is available to
members of the press.291 However, such viewing opportunities have
previously been limited to on premises (BBG offices) review without the
ability to make verbatim copies.292 Keeping in mind these more
cumbersome forms of access, there is still the question of whether the
press has the right to directly access and copy BBG material from the
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. See supra notes 259-72, and accompanying text.
288. See supra Part III (discussing relevant case law on the government's
ability to punish or prevent the publication of already public information).
289. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006).
290. See Essential Info., Inc. v. U.S. Info. Agency, 134 F.3d 1165, 1170 (D.C.
Cir. 1998) (Tatel, J., dissenting).
291. 22 U.S.C. § 1461(a) (2006).




BBG broadcasters themselves. 293 As the court in Gartner considered, if
the Constitution or FOIA provide access at all, what level of
"convenience of access" must they provide? 29 4
Gartner and other cases involving right of access issues have
consistently held that there is no constitutional right to access
government-held information that is not generally available to the
215public. Conversely stated, the Constitution does not confer on the
government an "affirmative duty to make available to journalists sources
of information not available to members of the public generally." 296
Following this line of logic, courts have also held that there is no right to
more convenient access, such as the ability to make verbatim copies,
even when access is permitted.297 Lacking a more convenient form of
access through the Constitution, the likely last resort for greater access
available to news organizations is the Freedom of Information Act.
298
In Essential Information, Inc. v. US Information Agency, the
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals considered whether, aside from the
299
statutory provision in the Smith-Mundt Act allowing for examination,
the press has a right to obtain BBG material through an FOIA request. M
293. See Berkowitz, supra note 21, at 288-92 (discussing recent case law
concerning the right to access information that is already in the public domain and
analyzing what this means in regards to the media's right to access BBG material).
294. See Gartner, 726 F. Supp. at 1190.
295. See id. at 1188-90 (noting that there is no constitutional right to access
government-held information or to have the government provide it in more
convenient forms such as verbatim copies); Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 15
(1978) ("Neither the First Amendment nor the Fourteenth Amendment mandates a
right of access to government information or sources of information within the
government's control."); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 834 (1974) (stating that the
media has no right to access inmates beyond the rights generally afforded to the
public).
296. Pell, 417 U.S. at 834. The Supreme Court has explained that no such
affirmative duty exists because "the first amendment reads in the negative,
'Congress shall make no law . .. ,' not in the affirmative." Gartner, 726 F. Supp. at
1187-88 (citing Edmond Kahn, Justice Black and First Amendment "Absolutes": A
Public Interview, 37 N.Y.U. L. REv. 549, 553 (1962)).
297. See Gregg v. Barrett, 771 F.2d 539, 546-47 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Gartner,
726 F. Supp. at 1190.
298. 134 F.3d 1165 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
299. 22 U.S.C. § 1461(a) (2006).
300. See Essential Info, Inc. v. U.S. Info. Agency, 134 F.3d 1165 (D.C. Cir.
1998).
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The court's analysis of the issue is rather short, as it quickly determines
that under FOIA Exemption 3,, the government is exempted from
having to disclose BBG material.302 According to the exemption, the
government may withhold information when the information is
"specifically exempted from disclosure by [a] statute," if the statute "(A)
requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as
to leave no discretion on the issue" or "(B) establishes particular criteria
for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld."3 03
Taking note of this language, the court determined that the Smith-Mundt
Act's ban on dissemination qualified as such an exempting statute under
Exemption 3.304 Thus, the court held that "on its face the Act appears to
be 'the sort of nondisclosure statute contemplated by FOIA [E]xemption
3' because it is 'a statute specifically exempting certain matters from
disclosure to the general public and leaving [USIA] with no discretion to
reveal those matters publicly."' 305 Since Exemption 3 applies, the
306government may deny FOIA requests for BBG information.
Currently, the decision in Essential Information represents yet
another blow to the media's right to gain more convenient and direct
access to BBG material.307 However, the dissenting opinion by Judge
Tatel in Essential Information does provide a legally sound alternative
examination of FOIA requests for BBG material that might be adopted
by other courts or circuits in the future. 30 In his dissenting opinion,
Judge Tatel first notes that courts have a duty "to construe FOIA
301. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (2006).
302. Essential Info., 134 F.3d at 1166. While the FOIA "calls for broad
disclosure of Government records," it does contain "nine exemptions" by which
government agencies may refuse to disclose information. C.I.A. v. Sims, 471 U.S.
159, 166-67 (1985).
303. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3)(A)-(B).
304. Essential Info., 134 F.3d at 1167.
305. Id. (quoting Tax Analysts v. IRS, 117 F.3d 607, 611 (D.C. Cir. 1997)).
306. Id. at 1169.
307. See Berkowitz, supra note 21, at 280-83 (criticizing the Court's decision
in Essential Information as out of line with precedent and noting that the decision is
"outdated, since much of the information that the Smith-Mundt Act protects is now
publically available on the Internet and through other sources").
308. See Essential Info., 134 F.3d at 1170-72 (Tatel, J., dissenting).
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exemptions narrowly., 30 9 This duty means that "congressional intent to
exempt matters from FOIA disclosure must appear in the 'actual words'
of the statute.,,3' 0 Focusing on the actual words of the statutes at issue,
Judge Tatel took issue with the fact that the court's decision glosses over
the difference between the words "dissemination" and "distribution"
(language found in the Smith-Mundt Act),3' 'and "disclosure," which is
the primary "focus of Exemption 3." 312 Judge Tatel pointed out that these
words convey quite different meanings. 3 13  "Distribution" and
"dissemination" generally refer to the spreading of information, whereas
"disclosure" refers to the opening up or exposing of information not
already available.314 Therefore, in Judge Tatel's view, the Smith-Mundt
ban more likely seeks to prohibit the spread of information, not its
disclosure upon a proper FOIA request.315
In addition to not finding a statutory intent to prevent disclosure
in the plain meaning of the words, Judge Tatel also argued that a
historical review of the legislative history shows the lack of such an
intent as well.316 Upon his own review of the history behind the
enactment of the Smith-Mundt Act and its later amendments, Judge Tatel
determined that congressional intent revolved around preventing
government propaganda, not preventing disclosure and publication by
other sources in the media.3 17 Taking this into consideration, Judge Tatel
argued that the majority failed to deduce the proper intent from both the
words of the statute and other evidence at hand.1 8 This flawed
interpretation of intent led to a failed application of Exemption 3 and
thus an improper denial of the FOIA request. 3 19
309. Id. at 1170 (citing John Doe Agency v. John Doe Corp., 493 U.S. 146,
152 (1989)).
310. Id (citing Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press v. U.S. Dep't of
Justice, 816 F.2d 730, 734 (D.C. Cir.), clarified, 831 F.2d 1124 (D.C.
Cir. 1987), rev'd on other grounds, 489 U.S. 749, (1989)).
311. 22 U.S.C. § 1461(b) (2006).
312. Essential Info., 134 F.3d at 1170.
313. Id. at 1170-71.
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. See id. at 1171.
317. See id.
318. See id. at 1170-73.
319. See id. at 1169.
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While Judge Tatel's dissenting opinion provides hope that other
courts might allow FOIA access in the future, for now, the press is left to
gather its information through the Smith-Mundt Act's provision allowing
"examination only" review of BBG materials by certain members of the
public,32o and through less conventional means such as the Internet and
the interception of BBG television broadcasts.31 Realistically though, the
American press will most likely have to rely solely on sources like the
Internet and foreign broadcasts because Gartner made clear that the
Smith-Mundt Act's provision for "examination only" viewing of BBG
materials does not permit the convenience of making verbatim copies of
such material.32 Given the press' need to fully document information,
this suggests that the only currently viable options for access are through
other means such as the interception of BBG broadcasts and the
Internet.323
V. CONCLUSION: RECOMMENDING MORE PRESS COVERAGE WITHOUT
TAKING STEPS TO REPEAL THE SMITH-MUNDT ACT'S BAN ON
DOMESTIC DISSEMINATION
As this Note has highlighted, the two key First Amendment
concerns about the press' rights under the Smith-Mundt Act's ban are (1)
the press' ability to obtain BBG material324 and (2) the press' ability to
publish that material.325 While access to BBG material might not come in
the most convenient forms for the news media, it is nevertheless
326
accessible through various mediums. Furthermore, even though FOIA
requests have been treated unfavorably under the Smith-Mundt Act,327
there is hope that new FOIA transparency mandates by President Barack
320. 22 U.S.C. § 1461 (2006).
321. See Essential Info., 134 F.3d at 1170 (discussing other means of accessing
BBG material).
322. Gartner v. U.S. Info. Agency, 726 F. Supp. 1183, 1190 (S.D. Iowa 1989).
323. See Essential Info., 134 F.3d at 1170 (discussing other means of accessing
BBG material).
324. See supra Part IV.
325. See supra Part III.
326. See Essential Info., 134 F.3d at 1170.
327. See id. at 1165 (majority opinion); Gartner, 726 F. Supp. at 1185.
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Obama and Attorney General Eric Holder might facilitate more robust
access to this information in the future.32 8
Just as the Smith-Mundt Act cannot fully prevent access to BBG
329
material, it most likely cannot restrain its domestic publication either.
Under the traditional rule of prior restraints, any attempt to prevent
publication of such material would likely be deemed unconstitutional as
an infringement upon the First Amendment's guarantee of a free press.330
And while the law of prior restraints would not bar punishment of
publication of BBG material after the fact,331 the application of the Daily
332
Mail standard almost certainly would3. Therefore, even though the
terms of the Smith-Mundt Act seem to prohibit domestic dissemination,
under First Amendment jurisprudence the government would have little,
if any, actual recourse against the publication of BBG material. 333
There seems to be little denying that the free flow of BBG
material would be beneficial for the American public. Access to this
information will give American citizens a means by which to inquire into
the particularly large portion of the United States' foreign diplomacy
mission that is carried out through BBG news organizations.334 With the
ability to analyze this portion of the United States' diplomacy efforts
voters can then vote to affect the changes they want to see in U.S.
diplomatic efforts and hold those currently in power accountable. 3 5 By
328. See Memorandum from Eric Holder, U.S. Att'y Gen., to Heads of
Executive Departments and Agencies (March 19, 2011), available at
http://www.justice.gov/ag/foia-memo-march2009.pdf. The memorandum states that
"[a]s President Obama instructed in his January 21 FOIA Memorandum, 'The
Freedom of Information Act should be administered with a clear presumption: In the
face of doubt, openness prevails."' Id. The memorandum goes on to state that just
because "as a technical matter ... the [requested] records fall within the scope of a
FOIA exemption" does not mean they should be withheld. Id. If records are withheld
in such instances, the memorandum warns that the Department of Justice will not
defend such a non-disclosure. Id.
329. See supra Part Ill.B.2.
330. See supra Part Ill.B.2.
331. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 711-12 (1931) (discussing the use
of punishment for violation of the statute).
332. See supra Part III.A.4.
333. See supra Part Ill.A.4.
334. See BBG Fact Sheet, supra note 9.
335. See Hugo M. Mialon & Paul H. Rubin, The Economics of the Bill of
Rights, 10 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1, 10 (2008) (discussing the importance of the
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being able to provide such information, the press is able to fulfill its
traditional role in our democratic process as both a contributor to and
moderator of our political and social discourse.
This Note certainly recognizes the importance of publication of
such information and the author shares the sentiment with others336 that
members of the public should be able to know what their government is
saying to the rest of the world about their own culture. However, due to
the strong likelihood that domestic publication of BBG material can
occur even under the Act's domestic dissemination ban, this Note differs
from other scholarly work regarding the Act337 by refraining from calling
for a repeal of the Act's ban. In other words, since access to BBG
material and publication of that material is possible even under the Act, a
repeal is not necessary to achieve the goal of obtaining a more plentiful
source of news and perspectives.
In addition to the rationale that since a repeal is not necessary it
should not be sought, there is the underlying notion that the Smith-Mundt
Act's domestic dissemination ban still does some good for the American
public. As several courts have noted, the primary Congressional intent
behind the ban was to prevent the U.S. government from spreading
propaganda to its own citizens. By leaving the Act's ban on domestic
dissemination as it is, the government itself would thus still likely be
339prevented from spreading propaganda to residents of the United States.
While an open flow of information certainly seems important in a free
society, equally important is that the information is not being force fed to
the public by its government. The beauty of the First Amendment
standards discussed throughout this Note is that, without repealing the
freedom of the press and noting "that it solves information problems in political
competition and increases government accountability").
336. Matt Armstrong, Reforming Smith-Mundt Act: Making American Public
Diplomacy Safe for Americans, WORLD POLITICS REVIEW (Aug. 2, 2010),
http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/6175/reforming-smith-mundt-making-
american-public-diplomacy-safe-for-americans (stating that the public should be
able to view BBG news broadcasts).
337. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
338. See, e.g., Essential Info., Inc. v. U.S. Info. Agency, 134 F.3d 1165, 1172
(D.C. Cir. 1998) (Tatel, J., dissenting); Gartner v. U.S. Info. Agency, 726 F. Supp.
1183, 1186 (S.D. Iowa 1989).
339. Whether it is morally proper for the government to be spreading what is
likely propaganda to foreign countries is beyond the scope of this Note.
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Act's ban, a harmony can be achieved whereby the press is still free to
serve its important informational roles and the government is still
restrained from using such entities as the BBG against its own people. It
is now time for the press to embrace the Act's weaknesses and bring into
the light the actions of a government agency that is known so well to the
rest of the world, yet so little at home.
